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THE RISE OF CAPITALISM IX JAPAXi
DV KA.MEKICHI TAKAIIASIIl
THE DEX'ELOPMEXT of Jajian's economy since the Restora-
tion of 1868 has been very abnormal. This was inevitable since
Japan was untrained in the system of capitalism, and obliged from
the beginning to face the competition of advanced nations, with
whom she was eager to be counted an equal in the shortest possible
time. I'nder these circumstances. Japan's economic transformation
has been marked by the following characteristics: 1) the wholesale
importation and eager imitation of occidental capitalism; 2) in this
whole process of imitation the ]\Ieiii Government itself was the
pioneer and aggressive leader ; and 3 ) the samurai were the class
who cooperated most readily with the Government in pursuit of thrs
policy of transforming the nation's industries according to the prin-
ciples of capitalism.
At the time of the Restoration, Japan emerged from a dying
feudalism and was suddenly brought into contact with a highly de-
veloped, western capitalism. Since there was not time for adapta-
tion, young Japan had no alternative but imitation. But even a policy
of imitation required some initiative, some spirit of adventure, qual-
ities that were pretty generally lacking among the people due to
the limitations imposed upon them by centuries of feudalism. Capi-
talistic enterprises called for risk and adventure, and these the peo-
ple were too timid to undertake. In such circumstances the Govern-
ment had to take the lead. This explains why industry in Japan has
been so dependent upon ]mternalism, bureaucratic leadership, and
protective tariffs.
The men who followed the lead of the Government in the im-
portation of ca])italism were not the somewhat slavish, old-fashioned
farmers, traders, and craftsmen, but rather the samurai. The whole
reorganization involNcd in the Restoration left this group without
their former nieans of supi)ort and therefore rather than undertake
comj^etition with the old economic groujis such as the farmer and
trader classes, thcv arce])U'd tlic lead of the ( loxcrnmcnt in the new
task of introducing western capitalism, l-'or (his task they were bct-
1'1'liis article written before llie M.incluirian iiuasion vvliioli began in
1931. not only traces the fieneral (le\clopnunt of Japanese econonn' since
1868. l)ut emphasizes tiie crisis of caiiitalisni in lapan just preceding, and
in some measure responsible for, tliat adventure. (Q.W.)
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ter prepared intellectually than any other class of society and they
went about their new business with great earnestness. Capitalism
came in, therefore, under the wings of the (Government and with
the newly disinherited feudal lords as eager students in the new
economic processes.
The contrast between ca]Mtalism in Euro])e and capitalism in
Japan is striking. In Europe the development was slow and regular,
and was carried forward by the old economic groups, while here it
was swift and irregular, and promoted by those who, in the old so-
ciety, were not producers but parasites. In Europe industrialism,
blest with the freedom inspired by the doctrine of laissc:: fairc,
molded the political order into shape in accord with its own require-
m-ents, but in Japan the political order, that is, the state, was from
the beginning the promoter and protector of industrial capitalism.
In Europe it was an evolutionary process coming up from below ; in
Japan it was an imitative process sponsored by the state.
Economic growth due mainly to imitation and Government aid
reached the limits of its possibilities during the Meiji era. Subse-
quent to this, independent and creative activity of capitalists became
necessary for further growth. While this tendency toward Iaisse.c
faire was on in Japan, capitalism throughout the world took on
a distinctly imperialistic color, and the advanced capitalistic na-
tions abandoned their laisscz faire policies in favor of a closer, more
cooperative relation between economy and politics. The economic
condition of Japan from the last year of the Aleiji era through the
eras of Taisho and Showa ( 1912^) presents extremely complicated
characteristics.
As is well known, Ja]ian's economic life underwent a wonderful
development after the Restoration in 1868. Capitalism reached a
climax in the Taisho era (1912-26). But the very soil in which it
had grown began to lose its nutriment anxl was exhausted by the
time capitalism had reached mature age. In the meantime, various
contradictory factors, corruption and other vices incident to capi-
talism were precipitated, so that within only sixty years from the
time of the Restoration. Japan's capitalistic economy met with seri-
ous obstructions. Some space must be devoted to an explanation of
the causes of this situation.
In Europe, capitalistic civilization required two or three cen-
turies for its develo]iment. while in Japan it was accomplished in
only half a century. ( )ne reason for this rapid development was
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that when Japan came in contact -with occidental civiHzation, she was
able to transplant and imitate scientific techniques which had taken,
in other countries, centuries of slow evolution to develop. Because
of this advantage, Japan was able to increase her productive power
and exploit her resources with exceptional rapidity. Large quanti-
ties of coal, copper, and other mineral resources, now tapped for the
first time, added to the nation's wealth. The extended services of
railways and steamships, too, facilitated the utilization of forests
and uncultivated lands as never before, thus greatly increasiiig the
nation's wealth. V>y the use of machinery, as well as the network of
banking and oommercial organization, the utilizable \aluc of labor
and ca])ital increased by leaps and bounds.
lint this imitation and ada])tatiim of occidental sciences and
technical ^kill have been worked to the limit, and now that the
national resources Iia\H' l)ccn almost cxhaustt'd, it is not too mucli
to say that iIhtc is no prospci^t tor lurtluT incTcasc of lajian's pro-
ductive ])ower 1)\- capitalistic nuiiiods. I\ail\\a\s, for instance, have
been constructed so far as is conimercially protitable. Collieries and
other mines lia\-e lieeii explnjted all o\er ilie country. The fmancial
system, machinei'v, clu'i)iit-;il induNlrie.s, and factories ha\e been
trans])lante(l as far as considered profitable, for ca])italisni justified
no further exi)ansion.
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Another reason for the exceptional economic development in
Japan dnrint^ the years followinoj the Restoration was the sudden
exploitation of ahnndant national resources. Railways and machin-
ery increased producti>e i^ower in a remarkahle manner, while in
agriculture and mining, there was a tremendous advance.
For instance, the area of cultivated land about 1877 was only
4,313,000 cJio (one cJ\o e(|uals 2.45 acres). In spite of the fact that
considerable farm land was given ri) to railways, factories, and
houses, by 1913 the total farm-land area had increased to 5,7^4 000
cho, and by 1922, to 6,090,000 cJio. In the mineral products, the in-
crease was far more striking. In 1874, for instance, copper pro-
duction was only 3. .516,000 kin (one kin e(|ual 1.322 lbs.). This
increased to 110.000,000 kin in 1913, an increase of aboi^t thirty
times. The product increased to 180,000,000 kin in 1*'17. In the
same interval (1874-1917) the amount of coal mined also increased
from only 208,000 French tons to 21,316,000, or more than a hun-
dred times. By 1919 it had increased to 31.271.000 French tons.
Similar increases were seen in silver, petroleum, sul])hur. and other
mineral products, as shown in Table 1. The development of Japan's
economy, we must admit, owes a great deal to the exploitation of na-
tional resources as indicated in these figures.
The exploitation of these resources, however, reached a climax
during the World \\'ar and from then on gradually failed to keep
pace with the development of national economy. Table 1 shows in
its lower columns that the Japanese mineral products, which had
been increasing in production to the time of the Great \\'ar, began
to decrease in most cases, especially copper and petroleum, which oc-
cupv the second or third position in importance among all mineral
products. Their present output is even smaller than the pre-war
figures. In 1913, for instance, the output of copper was 110.000,000
kin, the output of petroleum. 1,694,000 kokn (one koku- en^als 39.7
American gallons), which decreased to 101,000.000 kin of copper
and 1,406,000 koku of petroleum in 1927. It has been the same with
the arable land, which was on a steady increase uo to 6,098.000 cho.
in 1921. but began to decrease then, down to 6 080.000 cho in 1926.
a decrease of about 20.000 cho as com]5ared with 1921. During
1027. there was no increase.
It is a striking fact that the decreases in mineral products and
farm-land area have been unavoidable and could not be prevented
bv anv such means as extraordinary protection given by the Govern-
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ment. The import duty on copper, for instance, was raised in 1922,
from ven 1.20 per 100 kin to yen 7.00. (The latter rate represents
a protection amounting to yen 7,000,000 per annum, as the annual
production of copper is about 100,000,000 kin ) . The import duty on
petroleum, too, was raised in 1924 from yen 0.17 per 10 gallons to
\en 1.70. In the case of coal, government protection is afforded by
limiting the import of the cheaper Fushun coal, but even this has
not ])revented a decrease in production. There is also a special law
to keep up the price of rice. Another law, enforced after June, 1919,
encourages reclamation by giving" subsidies to persons who under-
take reclamation for the purpose of cultivation. Through the oper-
ation of these measures, the land reclaimed since 1*^^'21 totals 171,471
cho.
The amazing development of Japan's economy during the early
years of the Meiji period, in spite of the difficulty of competing with
advanced industries abroad, was primarily due to the low wages of
labor. In truth, low^er wages constituted the one weapon by which
Japanese capitalists were able to compete with other nations. At
present China enjoys this advantageous position. With the Sino-
Japanese War as a dividing line, however, wages began to rise at a
rapid rate, as shown in column A of Table 1. Starting from 1873
with 100 as the index number, prices rose in about twenty years only
to the level of 130 (excepting in 1882, the period for unconvertible
notes). P>y 1900 the index number had risen to 208, and by 1*'12 to
293. In 1926 the index number reached the peak of 918. The prices
current in 1926 w^ere, therefore, more than seven times as high as
thf)se prior to the Sino-Jajianese War (1892). In the meantime, the
rise in wages, as indicated by index numliers, was consideralil}' less
rapid than the rise in prices.
The extraordinary rise in wages since I'^OO has resulted in a
great increase in the cost of jjroduction and therefore in reducing
Jajjan's pow'er to compete with foreign industries. This is especially
true of competition with China, where wages are still very low. \'ar-
ious industries have arisen in lliat country in recent years which
menace Japan's industrial development. 'Ihe difficulty for Japan is.
therefore, internal as well as external. Must of the industries which
sprang up because of low wages lia\e either declined or gone out
of existence.
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TABLE NO. 1
Showinc^ rise in wages and i)rices.l
(A) (b)
INDEX NO. OF INDEX NO. OF
VEAR T0K^O PRICKS TOKYO WAGES
1873 100
1877 110
1882 142
1887 133
1890
. 130
1892 130.
1900 208 100
1907 266 128
1912 293 141
1917 376 181
1920 842 405
1926 918 437
IColnmn (A) contains index numbers for prices in Tokyo starting witli
100 in 1873. Data have been taken from the figures of the Money Investiga-
tion Society, the !\Iinistry of Agricuhure and Commerce and tlie Tokyo
Chamber of Commerce.
Column (B) contains index numbers prepared by the Tokyo Chamber of
Commerce regarding wages in Tokyo, starting with 100 in the latter half of
1900. In the case of wages as w-ell as prices, there has been an increase of
approximately 4507c since 1900.
The war with China in 1894-95 and the war with Russia in 1904-
05 were turning^ points in Japan's industrial development. One of
the main causes for this sudden and extraordinary economic develop-
ment after these wars was the growth of Japan's imperialism. Dur-
ing these years there was a rapid increase in the export of manu-
factured articles to the colonies and China. Trade statistics show
that exports to Korea, Formosa, and Kwantung (a sort of Japanese
colony) from 1898 to 1902 totaled only yen 16,700.000 per annum.
This average increased to yen 110.000.000 from 1912 to 1915. and
to yen 436.000,000 from 1924 to 1926. Avera.ge annt^al exports to
China for these three periods, 1898 to 1902, 1912 to 1915. and 1924
to 1926 were yen 38,217,000. yen 143.245.000. and yen 409.583,000
respectively. This extraordinary increase in exports to China was
due mainly to the exercise of Japan's imperiahstic privileges in
customs tarifTs and extraterritorial rights.
The development of industries in Japan has been, for the most
part, due to low wages and to an increase in exports to China. In
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the main, the industries that grew up were those that retiuired con-
siderable labor but very little technical skill. Inasmuch as such un-
refined articles are not demanded in ad\anced countries of the
West. China naturally became the best buyer of Japan's industrial
products. ^Moreover, China is Taiwan's immediate neighbor and the
special rights secured by the latter as the result of war with China
and later with Russia ga\c Tai)an special facilities for extending
her markets in China. The following table shows the dependence of
Japan's industries upon trade with China. The total export figures
do not include raw silk.
TABLE NO. 2
Comparison of exports to China with Japan's total export trade
EXPORTS TO china:
(in 1000 yen)
Total exports
Cnot inrliirline
Year raw silk) CHTXA PROPER KWAXTIXG HoycivOyG Total
(in 1000 ven) Amt. Per cent Amt. Per rent .\'nt Per cent Per rent
1887-92
I
29.585
|
6.856
|
23.17
\ \ \
8513 28.78
|
51.95
1893-97
I
42.490
|
12.162
|
28.63
| i i
19 PI 44.98
|
73.61
1898-02
I
134.049
|
38.218
|
28.51
|
I
|
34 521 25.75 | 54.26
1908-11
I
262.308
|
77.946
|
29.72
|
18,912
|
7.21
I
22.049 8.41
|
45.34
1912-15
I
404.910
|
143.245
|
35.38
|
25.463 I 6.29 | 30.753 7.59 | 49.26
1920-23
I
995.825
| 325,802 1 32.72 I 82.721
i
6.29
\
63.528 6.38 | 47.39
1924-26 11.286.092
j
409.583
|
30.18
|
63,538
|
7.10 | 63,538 4.94
|
43 89
TIo\v mtich the development of manufacturing industries in Japan
is due to exports to China is revealed by analyzing the principal ex-
port articles. In 1922 exports to China of the following articles
amounted to (S^\?)7 per cent of the total exports of those same arti-
cles : cotton yarn, cotton fabrics, refined sugar, beer, paper, glass
and glass articles, machines and their parts, articles of iron, rubber
tires. umbreUas, lam]:)s and their ]iarts, cotton blankets, soap, hats,
and insulated electric wire. These include almost all important arti-
cles of exprn-t from Japan. That is to say. Japan depends upon China
for about 70 ])er cent of her i)rincipal ex|)ort trade. These figures
explain clearly that Japan's industries, so far as foreign trade is
concerned, depend much upon exports to China.
But Japan's export trade to China has begim to decrease in re-
cent years. \\'hat is the cause for this decrease? The fimdamental
cause lies in the recent devel()i)ment <if manufacturing indtistries in
China owing to low wages. In her manufacturing industries. China
is now ])assing through the sta<.;o whicli |ai)an experienced in her
])Ost-Restoration ^ears. .\ siuiibii" r<Muark;d)le develoi)ment of na-
tional econonn' is now (.foing en in ( hina.
Exports to ( hina fmiu America or (Ireat I'ritain are mostly
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articles that China cannot produce at ])resent. In this more highly
technical production countries like Jai)an and China are unahle to
compete. The industries s])rino;ing u]) in Cliina are, therefore, of
the type that aiTect Japan. After the liuro])ean War. modern in-
dustries have been undertaken in China with the result that the
Chinese have been able to coinnete witli the ja])anese even without
the help of a protective tarift'. The i)rinci])al articles now being ])ro-
duced in China are as follows : cotton varn, fabrics, flour, matches,
raw silk, refined sugar, oils, beer, paj^er, leather, handkerchiefs,
soap, toilet articles, candles, glass, cigarettes, cement, ribbons, enam-
eled iron articles, canned provisions, umbrellas, knitted goods, towels,
hats etc. Without a single exception these articles are formidable
rivals of Japanese exports to China. Japanese-made matches, um-
brellas, and towels, for instance, have been driven entirely out of the
Chinese markets. This is a very severe blow to Japan's capitalistic
industries, in view of the fact that nearly one half of her exports of
these articles depends upon China. ^loreover, China's recovery of
tariff autonomy since 1930 has made it possible for her to encour-
age domestic industries by means of a protective tariff' and thus
force foreign goods from her home markets. This has meant a fur-
ther set-back to Japan's economy. Theoretically, Japan might ex-
pect a new development by manufacturing articles which require
greater technical skill in which a younger nation like China could
hardly compete. In fact, some industries in Japan are progressing
in this direction, but the solution of the present problem by such
means will be extremely difficult.
The rapid industrial development of the early days was due to
the Meiji Government's bureaucratic protection and guidance. This
paternal attitude was characterized by the following policies
:
( 1 ) Tariffs for the protection of home industries.
(2) Subsidies to domestic producers for the purpose of increas-
ing their profits. Some of these subsidies were given in fixed
amounts of money as in the cases of navigation and iron manufac-
ture, some by guaranteeing a certain rate of dividend, some bv giv-
ing tax exemptions or certain other privileges, and some by pur-
chasing domestic-made articles irrespective of ]:)rices.
(3) Low interest loans, for the purpose of lightening the burden
on capital, or a special law like the "Rice Act," by which the price
of an article was regulated in favor of certain groups.
(4) Organization of certain enterprises by the Covernment and
Till-: XlllON IIASIM KUIIM.I. 1 .\ Nil. tl.XII.U Ol loKN'O
A^; it .'ipj cared in 1883 (above) — As it appeared in 19^9 (below)
Coni] are witb illustralion on 1 age 199
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then selling them to prixatc inch'viduals at cxcepticjnally low prices.
This protective policy was successful in its application to infant
industries. When these industries reached the condition to which
reference has already heen made, those who were responsible for
their readjustment neglected fundamental reforms for which hard
labor and painful sacrifice were required, and tried to take an
easier course. The same protective policy was then abused in order
to bolster up old and declining industries. Inasmuch as govern-
mental protection under such circumstances would only help capi-
talists, it resulted simply in raising prices, and not in helping in-
fant industries.
When an industry begins to decline, there must be some defin-
ite cause and the only real remedy lies in an attemi)t to remove such
cause. If protection is continued, it simply encourages responsible
individuals to neglect the necessary reforms. In spite of these plain
facts, Japan is still a slave to the protective policy. An enormous
amount of monev has been spent in Japan since the financial reac-
tion of 1920 in various forms such as a protective tariff, govern-
ment subsidies, financial relief, and the like, constituting a very
heavy burden laid directly or indirectly upon the people's shoulders.
Some of the articles on which the people have had to pay ever-
increasing prices have been treated as follows by the protective tariff":
wheat was duty free prior to treaty revision in 1899, but by the tar-
iff revision of 1911 a duty of yen 1.85 per 100 kin was imposed,
and this was raised further in 1926 to yen 2.90 per 100 kin. For
cotton and plain tissues, the duty was raised to yen 15.30 per IOC'
kin in the revision of 1911. and further to yen 23.00 in 1926. In the
same period, the duty on iron nails was raised from yen 0.572 to
yen 1.25 per 100 kin and further to yen 2.40. The duty on copper
was raised from yen 1.20 per 100 kin in 1911 to yen 7.00 per 100
kin in 1926.
The above are typical cases—others might be cited. In addition
to the protection bv the tariff, the Government has been giving pro-
tection under various names and forms such as "subsidies" and
"financial relief," throueh the Central Treasury, the Bureau of De-
posits (chiefly of the Postal Savings), the Bank of Japan and other
special banks, all for the purpose of assisting capitalists either direct-
ly or indirectly. The Bank of Formosa alone obtained relief amount-
ing to yen 200,000.000. Other banks received yen 500,000,000.
through the Bank of Japan by way of special loans, making a total of
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yen /OO.OOO.OCO on this one occasion alone. The money expended un-
der the heads of "protection" and "rehef" must necessarily increas"
the cost of production eventually and thus weaken Japan's ability to
compete with other countries. Tf ])rotection is applied as a remedy
whenever Japan's capitalistic industries are confronted with a proh-
lem, it can only weaken the whole fabric in the long run. It be-
comes, as it were, a poison at the very root of industrial development.
At the time of the Restoration of 1868, the samurai, the leisure
class of that time was abolished. The system of hereditary trade, by
which a class of tradesmen monopolized certain trades, was also
abolished and the rule "no labor, no meat," was imposed upon the
whole nation. This great reform meant the sweeping away of the
conventional custom of leisure and luxury followed bv incompe-
tent members of hereditary families, ushering in a new regime for
free competition open to every ambitious man. It was a sort of
country-wide mobilization for the purpose of consummating a capi-
talistic system in Ja]:)an.
The Russo-Japanese War is the dividing line in the modern his-
tory of Japan's economy. For by that time, most of the leaders of
the great Restoration work, both in and out of the Ciovernment, had
either died or retired from active service, and had been succeeded
by their sons, or grandsons, who were mostly parasites or had be-
come accustomed to a luxurious life far beyond their means or
talents, owing to the wealth bec|reathed to them by their predeces-
sors. The leisure class, once abolished was thus revived in this
younger generation, through inherited wealth. Many Japanese who
held property left to them by their parents came into the manage-
ment of business corporations or of political parties, a situation not
considered by the general public as anything unusual. Most of these
men were far more luxurious than their predecessors who had won
iiigh jKjsitions in society by their actual ability. The extraordinary
rise in the cost of living and of production after the Ruro]:)ean War
is really due, more than anything else, to the luxurious hal)its of this
leisure class.
Tile increase of this class and their growing wealth has been
accelerated through the (k'\eloi)ment of a system of investment and
other economic schemes.
(1) .Many land-owners liaxc turni'd into leisured landlords.
(2) .Many ca])ila]ists ha\e become mere idlers after learning to
live on the interest and dixidends of tluir nione\- in\ested in securi-
ties or deposited in lianks.
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( S ) Those wlio live upon go\ernmcnt ])cnsions or bonuses have
ciuietly increased.
(4) The Government's policies arc inclined too much in favor of
the capitalists' interests, and as a result most of the benefits due to
general social progress go to these capitalists who simply increase
the number belonging to the leisured class.
After the installation of the Hamaguchi Cabinet of which he was
a member, the late Finance Minister Inouye- issued a pamphlet en-
titled "An Appeal to the People on the Reform of National Economy
and the Removal of Gold Embargo," in which he advocated a so-
called "retrenchment policy." In this pamphlet, Air. Inouye de-
scribed "the cancer" of present-day Japanese economy as consisting
of spending more than is earned, and he blames both the Government
and the people for this. In part he wrote as follows:
During the Great W'av, Japan had an extraordinary
revenue and arranged her finances according to her revenue.
But when the revenue decreased she did not reduce the cost
of living. On the contrary, the cost of living has increased
in spite of the reduced income. I believe this is a true de-
scription of the condition throughout the country. It is a
common rule all over the world that one ought to arrange
one's living according to one's income. This common law is
being violated in Japan. The Government, for instance, in-
stead of retrenching, is borrowing some yen 100,000,000 in
spite of the large deficit. ^ Most Japanese, riot only individuals
but also corporations and banks, have fallen into this habit,
and herein is the reason why the economic world of Japan is
so unstable and unsound.
Though everyone knows this truth, the difficulty lies in ac-
cepting its lessons. In the case of the Government, for ex-
ample, it is only a matter of reducing expenditure since the
revenue has decreased, but this fias not been done. The same
is true of the people. They are still accustomed to their old
habits of luxury which were contracted when they had large
incomes, and are yet unable to adjust their habits to changed
circumstances. What is the consequence of all this? Simply
that prices do not come down. Living is unstable. The em-
bargo on gold, the great obstacle to economic rehabilitation,
is still in force. Should such a condition be allowed to con-
tinue, business will go from bad to worse, and the world of
finance in Japan will remain unstable. The much discussed
-]\Ir. Inouye was assassinated in January, 1932. (Q.W.)
•The greatly increased military expenditures since the beginning of the
jNIanchurian Campaign in September. 1931. and abandonment of the gold
standard in December. 1931. has tremendously increased the government's
deficit and dependence on borrowing. (Q.W.)
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"depravity of thought" is due primarily to unsound economic
conditions, that is. to the popular habit of continuing a luxuri-
ous life when income has decreased. Should appropriate re-
form be neglected, there can be no proper development in
national affairs. For the economic reform is a national re-
form, and the former will be the sole and only way for the
future development of Japan as a nation.
This was a very suggestive warning to those who are respon-
sible for the unsound condition of the world of finance after the re-
action of 1920. for they neglected the necessary readjustment of
their businesses, and continued the "bogus dividend-paying policy,"
and other temporizing and makeshift management. As a matter of
fact, "the readjustment of business," was in order soon after the
European War, or more exactly, after the reaction of 1920. But the
men interested in the investment of capital persistently avoided this
important and necessary work. Instead, they have concentrated
their efforts upon temporizing measures. Such a policy is exactly
like that of th.e c|uack doctor, who puts off a necessary operation
with the resulting daily loss of strength. This loss of economic
vitality went on for several years, and the financial crisis which
visited Japan early in 1927 was but an exposure of the futility of
makeshifts. \Miy, then, did these capitalists continue such foolish
makeshifts? ( )ne might mention the following four fundamental
reasons.
(1) The necessary adjustment was too sweeping for these capi-
talists to carry out with any prospect of the continuation of their
business.
(2) By the same token, should they attempt thorough adjustment
of their l)usiness, they might lose their positions as directors, and
bring bankrui:)tcy to some of the shareholders.
(3) The Government's ])olicy of "financial relief" transferred the
loss to innocent i^eojile, leaving room for the capitalists to neglect
the necessarv readjustment and indulge in temporizing measures.
(4) The ca])italists entertained false hopes of future i^rosperity.
The ]iolicy of "relief" and the ho]x>s it has fostered, have deeply
im])lantcd a spirit of dependence in the Japanese world of finance.
;\ glance at ijolitical conditions after the European War reminds a
careful observer of the fact that i)olitics can easily be utilized for the
relief of the big capitalists.
When the j^rofits from their Imsiness decreased, and other losses,
direct and indirect, were sustained due to the decline of prices, our
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big lousiness men did not mal<e the necessarx" readjitstment by re-
ducing capital or di^idends, Ijut instead, tried to deceive the public
by a pretended maintenance of their credit. The directors of large
concerns, decided to continue high rates of dividends in spite of the
unprofitable condition of their business, and, hence, were forced to
tamper with the books. With continuing high dividends, these cor-
porations suffered more than ever from shortage of funds. At first,
the deficit was covered by means of loans from banks. But when
this became impossible, the responsible men proposed to the share-
holders an increase of the capital, or else resorted to debentures from
public subscribers, in order to ol^tain funds for bogus dividends.
The fund obtained by the increased capital or debentures, was not
used for the business, but mainly for the payment of these false
dividends or for meeting past losses.
In order to continue such temporizing measures, it was neces-
sary for the directors to hide the serious condition of the company's
business, for had the condition become known to the ]:)ul)Hc, no
shareholders would have favored an increase of the capital, nor
would outsiders have subscribed to the debentures to be issued by
such a company. Directors, therefore, endeavored to show that
their companies were in a sound condition liy continuing the high
and fictitious dividends. As for the shareholders, who paid for
the proposed increase of capital, they would accept the high divi-
dends and if necessary, borrow from the banks for the purpose of
paying up the additional capital. These shareholders had to depend
upon high dividends in order to pay the interest on their bank loans,
for should the rate of dividend fall below the rate of interest payable
to the bank, the shareholders would be threatened with bankruptcy.
Thev would, under those circumstances, invariably oppose a reduc-
tion of dividends, if such reduction were proposed by other share-
holders. These companies, therefore, became involved in a hope-
less dilemma in which the continuation of bogus dividends was ab-
solutely necessary.
While Japanese capitalists were trying to readjust their busi-
ness by means of compromise and even illegal measures, the Govern-
ment also resorted to various measures, for the purpose of assisting
these caoitalists. Since the financial slump of 1920 the Govern-
ment repeatedly resorted to such temporizing measures. The first
of these was the policy of fixing prices after they had begun to de-
cline, bv means of the funds held at the central Treasury and in the
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Bureau of Deposits. When prices take a very serious and sudden
drop without adequate reason, a policy to prevent further decline
is not necessarily a temporizing measure. But the case was cjuite
different. Under the pleasing name of "regulation," the Govern-
ment tried to prevent a decline of prices that was in complete accord
with normal principles of economy, for the purpose of lightening
the losses incurred hy capitalists. As a result, ibices in Japan
remained higher than the international level for a long time, caus-
ing an inactive condition of export trade and a constant excess of
imports, therehy weakening Japan's industrial foundations.
The Government also under the name "financial relief," misused
state funds held at the central Treasury and the Bureau of Deposits,
by giving relief to wealthy capitalists only, and thus helping them
to continue their temporizing measures. The most outstanding cases
were relief given to the Kokusai Kisen Kaisha (a steamship com-
pany), the Kwasaki Ship-building Company, the Bank of Formosa,
the Bank of Chosen, and Suzuki & Company.
After the great earthcjuake of 1923, moreover, the Government
took measures which were responsible for the sharp decline in ex-
change rates and the consequent unnatural rise in prices. The de-
cline of exchange was due to a laisscc-fairc policy, and the conse-
quent higher prices only helped the capitalists to make ends meet
instead of hastening fundamental readjustments. They were thus
relieved of the immediate burden, but with very disastrous results
in the long run. For in 1926, when the exchange began to improve,
business again suffered a painful depression. One industry after
another, was threatened with failure. The extraordinary rise in ex-
change rates in the latter half of 1926 proved a very severe blow
and lead to the financial crisis early in 1927. By higher tariff's and
other measures of protection, the Government caused further delay
in readjustment.
Cnder the present system of national economy, such tcmi)orizing
measures were first reflected in the increase of fixed loans from
banks, and a consef|uent shortage of funds in the banks. This policy
brought bank failures as early as the middle of 1021. The two semi-
government banks, the Dank nf l'^)rmosa and the I'ank of Chosen,
begrm to siitTcr from accumulated luans and exhausted funds. To
meet the situation, they absorbed call ile])()sits amounting to several
hundred millinn yen. COmmercial baulks. t(i<>, began to vie with
one another in inviting deposits in order to obtain necessary funds
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for new loans. Many banks tried to oret additional funds by means
of increased capital. Other l)anks obtained hi,<,di interest loans to
tide them over threatening crises. As a rule, after a financial slump
such as that of 1920, the rate of interest declines. Thit in this coun-
try, the rate of interest steadily rose in the wake of the reaction.
\\'hen Japan was favored with a most ])rosperous boom in 1919, for
instance, the highest current rate of discount on commercial bills
was 3.5 sen per day per 100 yen, the average being 2.09 sen. Dur-
ing 1925 and since, the rate mounted to 4 sen and the average was
2.6 sen or higher.
The reason why such an abnormal interest followed the financial
reaction of 1920 was that the temporizing measures we have de-
scribed brought about an ever-increasing waste of money. Both
companies and banks were unable to get funds to redeem their debts,
so that the urgent demand for funds persuaded them to float more
loans irrespective of rates of interest, which naturally rose under
such peculiar circumstances.
The end of these temporizing measures was a disclosure of
shortage of funds, which threatened failure. The indebted business
corporations and banks, tmable to redeem loans, merelv increased
their losses by shifts and subterfuges. Some of them found further
temporizing absolutely impossible. At this juncture, there was a
sudden rise in exchange rates in 1926, causing considerable loss to
exporters dealing in raw silk and other goods. Those banks and
business companies which had been weakened to the utmost were
unable to continue their lending policy.
For the purpose of preventing failure both capitalists and the
Government, conversant with the situation, hit upon a device in the
form of "a bill for remedial disposal of earthquake alTected notes,"
introduced in the Imperial Diet early in 1927, and calling for the
disbursement of yen 107,000,000. This fund was like a camphor
injection to a dying patient. The Government intended to lift the
embargo on gold as a result of the "relief" measure, but it was too
late. While the bill was under discussion in the Diet, the financial
disorder became known to sections of the public, and two or three
banks sufl'ered runs in March, 1927. In April such large banks as
the Jugo Ginko (Fifteenth luank) and the Bank of Formosa had
to close their doors, thus ruining the credit of Japan abroad in a
verv serious manner.
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How acute this financial crisis was. may l)c seen from the fact
rnat in order to meet it, the Government declared a three-month
moratorium ( promulgated on April 23 for instantaneous enforce-
ment ) . which was a most extraordinary measure according to the
law of Japan, and in the meantime, an extraordinary session of the
Imperial Diet had to meet (for five days from ]\Iay 3). In this ex-
traordinary Diet session, the following two hills were passed: (1)
A bill for compensating possible losses from special loans to he made
by the P.ank of Japan within the limit of yen 500,000,000: (2)
A bill for accommodating the monetary organs in Formosa amount-
ing to yen 2C0.0C0,CC0.
Rut before the actual enforcement of the extraordinary "relief"
measure, thirty-six banks had closed their doors with a total paid
up capital of yen 96,800,000, and deposits amounting to about yen
794.000,000, of which a large portion was already classified under
"losses." When the crisis reached a climax, banks prepared huge
amounts of money for possible payment of deposits. These amounts
may be approximately inferred from the note issue of the Bank of
Japan, which, prior to March 15, was about yen 1,080,000,000 but on
April 2?, increased to yen 2,659,000,000 so that the amount pre-
pared by banks for the possible payment of deposits was about yen
1,600,000,000. On account of this extraordinary note issue, the
P)ank of Ja]mn had to release all the reserve notes in store, and at
the same time make further extraordinary issues of new notes to
meet the urgent demands.
Needless to say, another "readjustment of business" on a larger
scale became necessary. A large number of banks, companies, fac-
tories, and commercial houses of various standings were liquidated.
The terror of the crisis, however, failed to persuade the gf^vern-
ment authorities as well as the capitalists of the need of thorough
readjustment. I'or they sought a remedial measure in these two ex-
traordinary i)arliamentary bills, with the result that on the financial
world of Jai)an was im])f)sed a heavy biu-den of al)Out 87*^,000,000
ven, transferred to the shoulders of the peoi)le to relieve a small
secti(Mi of the nation from imminent failure. The intended relief
was far from complete, for e\en in 1929 readjustment was con-
sidered necessary as may be seen from the ai)i)eal of I'inance IVIinis-
ter Inouye to the people from which (piotations were given above.
